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Responders at the Federal, state, and local level are critical to Homeland Defense 
and Security (HLDS).  Building from the recently published RAND and National 
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) report on responder safety, this 
thesis explores the issues associated with creating a safety risk management capability 
that will enable HLDS responders to better protect themselves from harm and enhance 
their readiness.  Risk management experiences within the military were benchmarked 
with emphasis upon lessons learned from the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy.  This 
revealed that Operational Risk Management (ORM), a risk-based decision-making tool 
that systematically balances risk and mission completion, and Crew Resource 
Management (CRM), a human factors-based team coordination training, should be the 
primary components focused upon to build the safety risk management capability.  
Development of ORM and CRM capabilities for HLDS responders will require strong 
national and local leadership, innovative measurement tools, clear accountability, and 
should be implemented via the national preparedness model outlined in Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) and HSPD-8.  ORM and CRM, if 
successfully established, can provide HLDS responders with the safety risk management 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. SEMPER NECESSARIUS 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) outlines an approach for 
the Nation built upon prevention, protection, response, and recovery (United States 
2002).  While this strategy stresses the need to improve our National capabilities against 
an intentional attack like those of 9-11, it also makes clear that this approach is equally 
aimed at preparing the Nation for major accidents and natural disasters.  Significant 
resources and effort have been expended upon improving the Nation’s abilities across the 
spectrum of these activities but the primary focus has been upon prevention.  The 
overhaul and dramatic restructuring of our intelligence community as well as extensive 
diplomatic and military action overseas were specifically undertaken with the intent of 
preventing further attacks.  Even if these prevention efforts are so successful that every 
attack against the Nation is thwarted, there will clearly still be a need for response to and 
recovery from the impacts of earthquakes, hazardous materials releases, hurricanes, 
volcanoes, and floods.  Whether a terrorist “gets lucky” and breaks through our defenses 
to launch an attack or if Mother Nature simply “does her thing,” the Nation and 
thousands of constituent communities will always have a need for their firefighters, law 
enforcement, and emergency medical personnel - our Homeland Defense and Security 
(HLDS) responders - to be ready to provide an effective response and recovery.  
Every time emergency responders go into action, they put their lives on the line.  
The potential for negative impacts upon health and safety is higher in responses to major 
natural disasters and terrorist attacks, but it is always present, even for routine actions.  
While protecting responders is an important goal in and of itself, their safety is also 
crucial to HLDS and to the effectiveness of the Nation’s response force.  Emergency 
responders are a critical element of our national strategy and it is vital to protect them 
from the inherent hazards of response work, not just for their good, or the good of their 
community, but for the entire Nation.  Injuries and occupational illnesses, both physical 
and psychological, immediately harm the individuals, their families, and their 
communities.  From a strategic standpoint, they negatively impact an organizations' 
preparedness and capability to perform necessary missions in the short and long term.  
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When HLDS responders are injured or are incapacitated by work-related illnesses, it not 
only precludes their reaction to an emergency today but may also make them unavailable 
for a disaster or attack in the future.  While it is clear that the hazards faced by responders 
can never be eliminated, much can be done to manage the risks involved, protect them as 
fully as possible, create opportunities for mission success, and ultimately enable them to 
more effectively fill their critical role within the National Strategy. 
B. A CALL FOR ACTION:  THE RAND/NIOSH REPORT 
To address issues related to the safety of responders, the RAND Corporation and 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) collaborated almost 
immediately following the attacks of 9-11.  They focused on preparedness, especially 
planning and training, and upon safety management as a means of controlling the hazards 
faced by emergency responders.  The study, recently published in a series of reports, 
combined an analysis of the systems and practices outlined in emergency response 
literature with firsthand experience and suggestions obtained from an extensive series of 
interviews with HLDS responders.  These included interviews with 70 emergency 
responders who were at the World Trade Center or at the Pentagon on and after 
September 11, at the Northridge earthquake (in California) or at Hurricane Andrew (in 
Florida); interviews with approximately 20 additional experts from the response 
community; and roundtable discussions with more than 100 members of the responder 
community (including this author) with experience, expertise, and interest in safety and 
health management issues who attended a 2003 RAND workshop.  The reports reflect 
input from firefighting, law enforcement, emergency medical services, public health, 
skilled support and trades, public works, disaster relief, local and state governments, and 
professional organizations, as well as key federal agencies involved with response:  
NIOSH; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); 
the Department of Defense (DOD) and three of the DOD services—the Army (including 
the Army Corps of Engineers), the Navy, and the Marine Corps; the Department of 
Justice; the Environmental Protection Agency; The Federal Emergency Management 
Administration; the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences; the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and the White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy.  The third of those reports, “Protecting Emergency Responders, 
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Vol. 3, Safety Management In Disaster and Terrorism Response,” primarily authored by 
Brian Jackson and cited as (Jackson 2004), is referred to simply throughout this thesis as 
“the RAND/NIOSH report” or more simply “RAND/NIOSH.”  It provides the primary 
impetus for this thesis:  Examining how to develop a safety risk management approach 
for HLDS responders that improves their safety and effectiveness. 
RAND/NIOSH outlines the requirements for a safety management approach for 
HLDS responders by first clarifying that the stakeholders are those “career responders 
and volunteers typically labeled as emergency responders—emergency management, fire 
service, law enforcement, and emergency medical service responders,” as well as a range 
of other disaster response workers such as “federal, state, and local personnel; public 
health professionals; skilled support personnel (including construction/demolition 
workers, transit workers, and utility services workers); disaster relief workers; and 
members of volunteer organizations” (Jackson 2004).  It then mandates a safety 
management approach for these stakeholders, noting that “all disasters present risks to 
emergency response workers—risks that may be familiar or unfamiliar, and that may 
vary widely depending on the nature of the event or the phase of the response,” and 
concluding that “Safety Management Is Risk Management - Because the work of 
emergency responders is inherently dangerous, managing their safety is more accurately 
described as managing their level of risk.”  This thesis refers to such an approach as 
“safety risk management.” 
RAND/NIOSH further explores safety risk management, breaking the process 
into three iterative functions: 
• Gathering information about the situation 
• Analyzing available options and making decisions 










Figure 1 Safety Management Cycle - From (Jackson 2004, pg. 5) 
 
RAND/NIOSH outlines requirements for safety risk management, specifying that it 
should be: “the methods, principles, and organizational structures through which the 
manager or managers of a response operation protect the safety and health of the 
responders”; that it should focus upon "ensuring that responders clearly understand the 
risks involved in their activities, eliminating or reducing as many of those risks as 
possible, recognizing any risks that cannot be fully controlled, and weighing the need for 
responders to carry out their duties against the dangers involved”; and that “effective risk 
management ensures that a response organization accepts no unnecessary risk, makes risk 
decisions in a way that guarantees clear accountability, and manages risk by planning.” 
RAND/NIOSH also provides direction for the approach HLDS responders should take in 
implementing safety risk management, specifically indicating that it should be an 
integrated approach that meets the needs of response by embedding safety risk 
management “into organizations' standard operating procedures to the extent possible.”  
This is further reinforced by the observation that the “majority of the benefits will occur 
only if common practices are developed and adopted by a large percentage of the 
responder community” (Jackson 2004, pg. 10).   
Systematic engagement of the HLDS responder community in development of a 
safety risk management capability requires coordination and leadership at the national 
4 
5 
level.  The RAND/NIOSH report specifically identifies some of the elements to be 
addressed at this level, including consistent organizational structures, common 
terminologies, standards for equipment and other technologies, guidelines for hazard and 
risk assessment, credentialing, and training curricula.  RAND/NIOSH further indicates 
that “national-level leadership could come from a range of sources, including the federal 
government, responder community and governance organizations, multidisciplinary 
standards organizations, or partnerships built among multiple agencies or 
organizations”(Jackson 2004, pg. 95); argues that “strategic planning and management 
well before the event, along with standardized systems and procedures, are key”; and 
concludes that “preparedness is the crux of effectiveness” (Jackson 2004, pg. 6)  
RAND/NIOSH also hints that the recent implementation of the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and National Response Plan (NRP) as initiated by Home 
Security Presidential Directive 5 of 2003 (HSPD-5) and the National Preparedness Plan 
based on capabilities-based planning as outlined by HSPD-8 in 2004, represent both a 
possible framework and a major opportunity for ensuring that safety risk management is 
integrated into organizational structures for responders (Jackson 2004). 
C. AN ANSWER TO THE CALL:  OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
AND CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
As noted previously, RAND/NIOSH defines the parameters for safety risk 
management, indicating that HLDS responders should not accept unnecessary risk (and 
accordingly, should take necessary risks); should make risk decisions via a command and 
control process that ensures accountability; and should incorporate the risk management 
process via planning.  Operational Risk Management (ORM), a standard risk 
management process used throughout the military to increase chances of success within 
high risk environments, is a clear candidate to meet these requirements.  ORM focuses on 
the mission at hand, characterizes the risks and potential benefits involved, and develops 
safeguards to promote mission success.  It applies a force protection approach that 
ensures resources and capabilities are available and sustainable, e.g. kept safe, to 
continually execute an operation.  However, ORM may not suffice as a stand-alone 
process.  Crew Resource Management (CRM), a human factors-based training regimen 
that develops team-oriented skill sets, provides a framework to systematically apply 
ORM.  Used in conjunction with each other -- ORM embedded in CRM -- they can be 
6 
more effective.  Accordingly, this thesis examines ORM, CRM, and their combination as 
candidates to build the logical, repeatable safety risk management capability for HLDS 
responder called for by RAND/NIOSH. 
D. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 
MODEL AS PATHWAYS 
RAND/NIOSH indicates that strategic planning is a key process in systematically 
addressing HLDS responder safety; that the preparedness process must occur in an 
integrated approach adopted by a large percentage of the responder community; and that 
the National Preparedness Plan based on capabilities-based planning as outlined by 
HSPD 5 and HSPD-8 represents both a possible framework and a opportunity for these 
processes.   
Strategic planning describes a systematic process by which a strategy is converted 
into necessary actions that link inputs to outputs and outcomes to achieve a desired result.  
The concept of “strategy” itself is nearly universally recognizable, yet a single definition 
remains elusive.  The U.S. Military defines it as “the art and science of developing and 
using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace 
and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities 
and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat” (DOD 2001), 
while others have simply described it as “setting priorities and making choices between 
competing alternatives under conditions of limited resources” (Krepinevich 2000).  It can 
be looked at as a grand design, as an approach to a problem, or as a roadmap for solving 
complex problems, but ultimately it is about linking means to ends.  Indeed, the best 
evaluation of strategy is whether it actually achieves the objective it was formulated to 
meet in the first place.  The generally recognized master of strategic planning, John M. 
Bryson, defines this art of translating strategy to a plan of action as the disciplined effort 
to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization 
(or other entity) is, what it does, why it does it, all with a focus on the future (Bryson 
2004).  He outlines “the disciplined effort” in a strategic planning cycle with the 
following ten components or steps (Bryson 2004): 
1. Agree on a process 
2. Clarify mandates 
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3. Identify stakeholders, mission and values 
4. Conduct analyses  
a. Benchmarking 
b. Strength/Weakness/Opportunity/Challenge (SWOC) 
5. Frame strategic issues 
6. Formulate strategies to manage the issues 
7. Review and adopt the Strategic Plan 
8. Establish “Vision for Success” 
9. Develop implementation process 
10. Reassess  
For the purposes of this thesis, strategic planning describes the processes necessary to 
ensure that the inputs (responders) are able to achieve outputs (safe and effective 
response actions) that ultimately result in the desired outcome (sustainable preparedness 
and response capability for HLDS). 
This thesis does not develop a strategic plan, because a single author’s work 
would not be appropriate for a process which should involve an organizational or systems 
approach with multiple owners and strategic planning participants.  However, the initial 
steps of the strategic planning provide a convenient, standardized framework for 
derivation and discussion of key issues.  This thesis uses the RAND/NIOSH report in the 
definition of the process, clarification of mandates and identification of stakeholders and 
their mission and values.  The analytical process of benchmarking is applied by 
examining several uses of ORM and CRM within the military and by emphasizing 
lessons learned within the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S. Navy (USN).  The 
capabilities-based planning process outlined in the National Preparedness Plan, and 
expected by RAND/NIOSH, is also consistent with Bryson.  Using it to further define 
parameters for a safety risk management capability confers the added benefit of 
alignment with the NRP, NIMS, and associated national strategies, increasing impact and 
the likelihood of sufficient resources. 
E. SUMMARY 
This thesis explores issues that HLDS leaders must address before developing an 
approach to implementing safety risk management for response organizations.  This 
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chapter outlined the mandates expressed in the RAND/ NIOSH report.  These include the 
requirements for a safety risk management process to be used by HLDS responders and 
the need for national-level leadership and alignment with the NRP, NIMS, and the 
national capability-based planning process.  It also identified ORM and CRM as 
reasonable approaches to fulfill the RAND/NIOSH report’s requirement for HLDS 
responder safety risk management.  Chapter 2 further examines ORM and CRM as 
components of a safety risk management capability.  Chapter 3 benchmarks different 
organizational approaches to ORM and CRM with emphasis upon lessons learned from 
the USCG and USN, identifying best practices and key issues.  Chapter 4 harmonizes the 
initial steps of Bryson’s strategic planning cycle, as bounded by RAND/NIOSH and 
benchmarking, with the capabilities-based planning process of HSPD-8.  The 
examination of these key issues provides a foundation upon which an iterative process 
can be built that will enable HLDS responders to meet their strategic objectives of being 




II. COMPONENTS OF SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT 
A. RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
Derived from the Italian word risicare, meaning “to dare,” risk is often defined as 
a product of the probability of occurrence of an accident and the consequences or impact 
of that accident (Bernstein 1996, pg. 8).  When risk is associated with an action rather 
than an accident, it allows a simple way of examining both the probability of an action 
and the potential adverse consequences that may be associated with that action, such as 
injury, loss of life, economic loss, environmental damage, failure to achieve a mission, 
failure to achieve a strategic goal, failure to advance a national policy.   
The use of risk management is not new.  Because humans are and historically 
have been consistently vulnerable to a variety of hazards, risk management is intuitively 
part of successful survival strategies.  Indeed, risk management was actually an overt part 
of some ancient societies as evidenced by an early group of “risk analysts” who lived in 
the Tigris-Euphrates valley about 3200 B.C.  Their services were highly sought out as 
they were noted for their ability to characterize a problem, determine options, predict 
outcomes and make recommendations regarding the best path -- a combination of 
processes that would now be called risk management (Covello 1985). 
In any type of risk management, a risk assessment must first take place.  Its main 
objective is the determination of current or base levels of risk in a complex system.  
Secondary objectives are identification of the sources of failure and error, and 
identification of system factors that may cause the risk in the system to increase to 
unacceptable levels.  Risk assessments essentially answer three questions: 
• What can go wrong? 
• What is the likelihood that it will go wrong? 
• What are the consequences if it does go wrong? 
Risk management then builds upon the risk assessment, providing a framework 
for achieving and maintaining an acceptable level of risk.  Risk management implies that 
measures to reduce the frequency and consequences of accidents can be identified and 
evaluated.  Risk management focuses on preventing situations that contribute to 
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accidents, focusing upon those that reduce both the frequency and severity of possible 
accidents.  Risk management answers the following questions: 
• What can be done to prevent accidents and to minimize their 
consequences? 
• What alternatives are available, what trade offs must be made, and how 
effective are potential risk reduction efforts? 
• What are the impacts of current risk decisions on future situations? (USN 
2004) 
B. OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGMENT 
Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a decision-making tool people at all 
levels use to increase operational effectiveness by anticipating hazards and reducing the 
potential for loss, thereby increasing the probability of a successful mission (USN 2004).  
It is distinguishable from the many other forms of risk management by both the definition 
of users and by the approach to the utility of risk.  In ORM, the “operational” includes all 
personnel who contribute either directly or indirectly to mission successes, including 
every person at every level involved with operations, maintenance, and support.  The 
responsibility to characterize potential risks and compensate for them is thus spread 
throughout an organization, rather than being centralized in a particular department or 
individual.  In ORM, the traditional risk management approach that risk is “bad” is not 
applicable.  It relies instead upon a philosophy that taking calculated risks is essential for 
an organization.  The aim is to increase the potential for mission success by reducing the 
risk to personnel, resources, and the environment to an acceptable level associated with a 
particular unit for a given situation.  ORM focuses on missions, the risks involved, and 
the safeguards in place to ensure mission success.  Beyond reducing losses, ORM 
provides a logical process to identify and exploit those opportunities that produce the 
greatest return on the investment of time, dollars, and personnel.  Ultimately, ORM leads 
to operational success by ensuring forces are available and well prepared for execution of 
any plans.  Within the military, ORM has become the standard process to increase 
chances of success within high risk environments.  As Captain Dennis M. Faherty, the 
previous director of the U. S. Navy’s ORM Program states, “the success of any 
[operation] is based upon a willingness to balance risk with opportunity, in taking bold, 
decisive action necessary to triumph” (Persons 2003).  Indeed, the use of such risk-based 
11 
decision-making processes can enable a commander to boldly execute a plan with 
“knowing confidence instead of groundless audacity” (Beckvonpeccoz 1997, pg. 17). 
The military’s implementation of ORM was based on a number of internal studies 
relating human error and mishaps in which faulty risk decisions placed personnel and 
assets at greater risk than was warranted and which resulted in the loss of personnel and 
equipment.  Within the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), four major marine mishaps with loss 
of life between 1991 and 1993 occurred, most notably the capsizing and sinking of the 
Fishing Vessel SEA KING at the mouth of the Columbia River.  The National 
Transportation Safety Board investigation of this incident included two specific 
recommendations regarding a need for Coast Guard-wide risk assessment and 
management training.  As a specific organization policy and set of tools, ORM was 
formally implemented within the USCG in 1999 (USCG 1999). The Army, Air Force, 
Navy, and Marine Corps developed and implemented ORM for similar reasons and along 
a similar timelines. 
ORM can be precisely defined as:  “A continuous, systematic process of 
identifying and controlling risks in all activities according to a set of pre-conceived 
parameters by applying appropriate management policies and procedures.  This process 
includes detecting hazards, assessing risks, and implementing and monitoring risk 
controls to support effective, risk-based decision-making” (USCG 1999, pg. 6).  In 
implementing ORM, the Army, Navy, and Marines now use a five step process (USN 
2004), the Air Force uses six steps, and the USCG uses seven steps (USCG 1999).  
Diagrams of these models appear below in figure 2. 




Evaluate Risk vs. Gain
Execute Decision
Monitor Situation
Figure 2 Examples of Military ORM Models 
 
Upon closer examination, the differences between the various models are of limited 
importance, reflecting instead slightly different approaches in where to draw the boxes or 
circles that describe the components of ORM.  Across the services, four common 
principles are consistent:  
• Accept no unnecessary risk.  While most operations entail some risk, 
accepting unnecessary risk conveys no commensurate benefit.  The most 
logical courses of action for accomplishing a mission are those meeting all 
mission requirements while exposing personnel and resources to the 
lowest possible risk. ORM provides tools to determine which risk or what 
degree of risk is unnecessary. 
• Accept necessary risk when [expected] benefits outweigh costs.  It is 
critical to compare all identified expected benefits to their associated risks 
as this helps to maximize capabilities. Even high-risk endeavors may be 
undertaken when decision-makers clearly acknowledge that the sum of the 
expected benefits exceeds the sum of the costs. Balancing costs and 
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benefits may be a subjective process open to interpretation and ultimately 
the appropriate decision authority may have to determine the balance. 
• Make risk decisions at the appropriate level.  Depending on the situation, 
anyone can make a risk decision; however, the appropriate level to make 
those decisions is that which most effectively allocates the resources to 
reduce the risk, eliminate the hazard, and implement controls.  
Accordingly, managers at all levels must ensure their personnel are aware 
of their own limitations and when a decision should be referred to a higher 
level. 
• ORM is as critical to execution as it is to planning.  While ORM is vitally 
important in an operation’s planning stages, risk can change dramatically 
during an actual mission. Therefore, managers and supervisors should 
remain flexible and integrate ORM in executing tasks as much as in 
planning for them. 
Each of the service’s ORM processes and tools are also commonly defined by three 
specific, temporally-based levels: time-critical or tactical; deliberate or operational; and 
strategic.  Most actual applications of ORM occur at the tactical and operational level 
(USCG 1999).  HLDS responders have a similar focus upon time-critical field operations 
and upon operational planning. 
C. EXAMPLES OF ORM SUCCESS WITHIN THE MILITARY 
The following examples of ORM illustrate the four principles outlined above as 
well as the ability of consistently applied, continuously used ORM to improve chances 
for mission success. 
1. To Tow or Not to Tow 
A USCG station received a phone call patch from a disabled vessel, via the 911 
operator, that requested assistance because it was disabled and adrift.  The weather was 
soon expected to deteriorate.  A small boat was dispatched to investigate and take action 
as needed. 
Upon arrival on-scene by the USCG small boat with the disabled vessel, the 
coxswain and crew found the weather conditions to be relatively steady with south winds 
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at 10 to 15 knots and seas at 2 to 3 feet.  Personnel on the disabled boat already had on 
life jackets and were told to keep their life jackets on during the evolution.  The coxswain 
proceeded to ask the operator what problems he was having with the boat.  He was told 
that the steering was out and the battery was dead.  Other than the fact that the boat was 
an older model boat, the coxswain felt comfortable with the way the vessel was riding in 
the water and had no reason to believe from his visual inspection that the boat might be 
taking on water or that it was not sea-worthy.  Because the vessel had no anchor, power, 
radio, was drifting away from land, and the weather conditions were forecast to worsen, 
the coxswain decided that it would be better to tow the vessel into port rather than 
attempt to remove the personnel and let it drift.  Applying the Green-Amber-Red (GAR) 
ORM model, the coxswain determined that with the current sea conditions, the risk of 
injuring someone by attempting to remove them from the boat outweighed the risks to 
personnel during a towing evolution.  The coxswain told the owner of the boat that the 
Coast Guard small boat would take the disabled vessel in stern tow and that if there were 
any problems along the way to wave their arms to get the boat crew's attention.  A few 
minutes later, the vessel was taken in tow using a skiff hook connection to the vessel's 
trailer eye bolt. 
Approximately 100 feet of tow line was paid out and the vessel was towed at a 
speed of 4 knots.  As the sea state picked up to 3 to 4 feet, the towing speed was 
decreased to 2 knots to compensate for the increased sea conditions.  The coxswain 
waved his hand at the owner of the boat and the owner gave the coxswain the thumbs up 
signal, letting the coxswain know that everything was alright.  A few minutes later the 
personnel on the disabled vessel had moved to the front of their boat but were not waving 
their arms, giving the coxswain no reason to believe that anything was wrong.  A few 
minutes after that, however, the owner of the vessel began waving his arms excitedly at 
the boat crew. 
The coxswain backed down to the vessel and immediately noticed that it was 
sitting heavy in the stern.  The towline was disconnected from the disabled vessel.  The 
small boat was maneuvered alongside the vessel and the personnel were removed with 
the coxswain concurrently determining that it was unsafe to attempt to de-water the 
vessel. 
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About two minutes later the vessel sank.  The coxswain asked the owner of the 
vessel how long they had noticed that they were taking on water before they waved their 
arms.  The owner stated that they had been taking on water over the gunwale for only a 
few minutes.  The crew returned to the station with the personnel from the sunken vessel 
and moored safely without further incident.  
The coxswain had determined from training, experience, and application of ORM, 
that the best initial course of action was to tow the vessel into port.  This decision was 
based on several factors:  1) the boat was not taking on water upon arrival on scene; 2) 
the proximity of where the vessel was disabled to the nearest safe port was a short 
distance, approximately 3 nautical miles; and 3) the disabled vessel had no anchor on 
board so it could not be anchored in place.  Through continuous application of ORM, the 
coxswain correctly determined that the best risk management action was to leave the 
people on the disabled boat while being towed because the sea state was not calm enough 
to conduct a personnel transfer safely.  As the situation changed, so did the risk 
management equation, with the risks to the persons aboard a sinking vessel outweighing 
the risks associated with the personnel transfer.   
During subsequent debriefs, other possible solutions for this case were discussed 
but the course of action taken was validated as the most appropriate in terms of risk 
management (USCG 2005a). 
2. Navy E-2C Maintainers and the Mines of Afghanistan 
A crew of maintainers for the E-2C “Hawkeye” – a carrier-based airborne early 
warning and control aircraft that provides radar coverage, warnings of possible threats 
and the exact locations of targets -- from the USS Enterprise were in the Arabian Gulf on 
a regularly scheduled six-month deployment and tasked to provide support for Operation 
Mountain Resolve.  Because of the transit time from the Arabian Sea to the operating 
area and the E-2C's inability to refuel in-flight, the Hawkeyes needed to “hot-pump” at 
Bagram, Afghanistan before flying their mission, and once more for the trip back to the 
carrier.  Several of the maintainers were detached to Bagram for the additional support 
associated with a crew-switch process and for any minor maintenance that might become 
necessary during the transits to the airfield or for the return to the carrier.  
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During the pre-brief and upon arrival at the field in Bagram, the five-step ORM 
process was employed.  The operations were quick paced, on an unfamiliar airfield, and 
were continuously adapting to high-tempo ops.  The hot refueling operation took place at 
one end of the runway with the recovery and shut down on the opposite end.  
During the recovery of one of the Hawkeyes, an Air Force C-17 was taking off 
and using the same taxiway.  In order to accomplish this, the C-17 inadvertently turned 
its exhaust on the E-2C, sending the crew’s gear flying out into a field next to the 
taxiway.  Once the dust had settled, the crew’s first thoughts were to recover their gear, 
now scattered in the open field.  However, they were aware of the hazards reviewed 
during their ORM sessions, one of which was the presence of minefields around the base, 
and considered the risk controls associated with potential “off track” operations. 
Instead of following their initial impulse to enter the field and recover their gear, 
the crew notified airfield management about the problem and then proceeded to recover 
the Hawkeye without all of their equipment, including some personal protective 
equipment (PPE) that was normally a safety requirement.  When the Army Corps of 
Engineers checked on the field the next day, the field was not considered a cleared area.  
Although the gear was later recovered without incident and eventually returned to the 
maintainers, the risk of inadvertently triggering a mine was considered to be very real. 
Despite shortcomings in experience around minefields and in non-carrier 
operations, the principles of ORM were used to balance the risks of the unknown (a mine 
field) and the known (operating without PPE), allowing the crew to complete its unusual 
mission with no incidents (Sheldon 2004). 
3. A Search Gone Astray… and Aground 
At approximately 2100, a USCG Group Operations Center (Opcen) received a 
call via cell phone from a national park ranger relaying a second-hand report of a possible 
person in the water (PIW) near an old lighthouse site.  The Group Operations Duty 
Officer (ODO), after consulting with the Group Command Duty Officer (CDO), the 
Group Commander, and the applicable District Command Center Search and Rescue 
(SAR) Controller, requested a 47 foot Motorlifeboat (MLB) from the USCG station near 
the lighthouse site to search for the possible PIW.  
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At approximately 2200, the MLB got underway with a four-person crew.  The 
weather was broken with rain squalls and moderate seas of 3 to 5 feet.  Using the 
Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC), a computerized search and rescue 
planning tool, the ODO developed a parallel search pattern that could be executed just off 
the beach in the vicinity of the lighthouse site.  This search pattern was evaluated by the 
District Command Center SAR Controller, who directed a reduction of track spacing 
from 2/10 to 1/10 nautical mile in order to improve the probability of detection.  The 
CDO attempted to pass the search pattern to the through the station’s watch stander by 
describing the corner points and major axis of the pattern.  This was ineffective and the 
coxswain requested and received, via a cellular phone conversation with the ODO, the 
latitude and longitude of the Commence Search Point (CSP) and the 43 turn points of the 
search pattern.  The coxswain directed two crewmembers to plot CSP and the turns onto a 
paper chart; the positions were also entered as waypoints into the boat’s electronic Global 
Positioning System.  The search pattern was difficult to plot due to the scale of the paper 
chart and was not completed.  At approximately 0330 the next morning, after completing 
approximately 70% of the pattern, the MLB made a 90-degree turn to port in order to 
start an outbound leg of the search pattern.  A few seconds later, it struck the center of 
three narrow steel groins (jetties) extending approximately 450 feet from the beach.  
Unsuccessful in attempts to free the MLB and taking repeated 90 to 120 degree rolls as 
the vessel was struck by 4 to 6 foot seas on the beam, the coxswain directed the crew to 
abandon the vessel.  After the entire crew was in the water, the coxswain realized that the 
MLB's port engine was still running at an extremely high RPM.  Fearing that the MLB 
would come off the groin and injure himself or his crew, the coxswain elected to re-board 
the vessel and secure the engines.  The coxswain then swam to the beach to meet the 
other members of his crew.  As the coxswain had suspected, the MLB floated free of the 
groin; it consequently arrived at the beach at about the same time as the coxswain. 
The investigation of this mishap determined that a primary causal factor was the 
failure by the coxswain, the crew, the Opcen, and the District Command Center, to 
properly use ORM.  Although an initial Green-Amber-Red (GAR) model was used by the 
coxswain and crew while readying the MLB for the mission, it was not formally 
conducted or documented.  Additionally, as mission elements changed, the coxswain, 
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crew, and their chain of command failed to re-evaluate the risks involved.  A post-
incident use of the GAR model revealed that had they done so, either additional controls 
would have been needed – i.e. more appropriate search assets such as a helicopter for the 
mission and/or revision of the search parameters – or the search would have been 
suspended until first light.  However, the on-scene ORM used by the coxswain was 
deemed appropriate.  His decision to risk himself in re-boarding and securing the engine 
was correctly outweighed by the potential benefits (and actually realized benefits) of 
preventing the MLB from coming off of the groin under power and further damaging it 
and/or striking him or his crew. 
Notably, many of the corrective actions taken in response to this mishap were 
specifically aimed at addressing ORM deficiencies.  The Opcen, ODO, and GDO 
watchstander qualification requirements were modified to ensure a better awareness of 
the risks associated with nighttime operations as well as how to incorporate that 
understanding within an ORM construct; specific exportable risk management training 
was implemented for SAR controllers; and ORM and other risk management skill sets 
were integrated into the Ready For Operations process used to evaluate station readiness 
(USCG 2005a). 
4. ORM for the Military Points to ORM for HLDS Responders 
A key similarity between these examples is how ORM’s focus upon mission and 
balancing risk with expected benefits either facilitated the success of the operation or 
could have prevented mishaps that interfered with completion of the operation.  Another 
is that the operations involved rapidly changing environments with multiple hazards, 
characteristics similar to those of HLDS responders.  There are also great similarities in 
organizational structures between the military and HLDS response organizations.  These 
observations lead to the logical conclusion that the military’s success (or lack thereof) in 
the use of ORM could be similarly conferred to HLDS responders. 
D. CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Human Factors (HF) research focuses upon identifying, measuring, and 
characterizing elements associated with optimizing the performance of people.  With twin 
objectives of safety and efficiency, HF traditionally examined the relationship between 
humans, machines, and the environment through the systematic application of human 
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sciences including psychology, anatomy/physiology, and sociology, all within a 
framework of system engineering.  Just as importantly, HF provides a better 
understanding of the relationships between people and the impact of their interactions 
within the context of human-machine-environment systems.  Historically, flight 
operations were the impetus to conduct HF research as well as the primary laboratory and 
recipient of most HF-related performance enhancements.  The legacy of HF research and 
impact in aviation included the design of controls, displays, cabin layout, maps and 
charts, and communications systems; however decision-making processes and training 
were also major beneficiaries with aviation from HF.  Prominent among these HF-related 
techniques and methods is what has become known as Crew Resource Management 
(CRM).  
The concept of CRM originated in 1979, at a NASA workshop that examined the 
role that human error plays in air crashes (Cooper 1980).  This workshop, which used 
research from aviation accidents during the 1970’s and specific analysis of Flight Data 
Recorders and Cockpit Voice Recorders delved past the first cut knowledge that some 70 
to 80 percent of all aviation accidents were linked to human error.  Key observations that 
emerged were that crews did not fulfill its assigned roles on the flight deck, that flight 
crews made mistakes because they generally failed to make best use of readily available 
resources, and that these failures could be characterized by poor group decision-making, 
ineffective communication, inadequate leadership, and a lack of risk management (David 
1996).  Subsequent analyses of 35,000 reports of incidents over 7.5 years found that 
almost 50% had resulted from these types of flight crew errors with an additional 35% 
associated with similar air traffic controller errors (Billings 1984). Coupled with related 
research, which noted that many aviation training programs exclusively emphasized the 
technical aspects of flying and did not address crew management strategies, these mishap 
analyses led to a near consensus in commercial aviation that training and operational 
practices needed to place greater emphasis upon crew coordination factors and the 
management of crew resources (ICAO 1989).  Subsequent research in Naval aviation 
found similar results, with one study reporting that 59% of "Class A mishaps” -- those 
involving serious consequences including fatality, destroyed aircraft, and major injury – 
were attributable to similar factors (Wiegmann 1999). 
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Cockpit Resource Management which uses  “all available sources -- information, 
equipment, and people -- to achieve safe and efficient flight operations", was first labeled 
as such by John K. Lauber, a psychologist and member of the National Transportation 
Safety Board (Lauber 1987).  Using HF research, which noted that pilots’ behavior 
during routine operations significantly influenced the ability to function in stressful, 
workload intense situations, Cockpit Resource Management incorporated the practice of 
crew coordination skills normally performed in flight.  It also provided for the use of 
personal leadership styles to foster group effectiveness.  This and related research further 
suggested that behavior and performance changes could not be accomplished in a short 
period of time, even if the training was well designed.  Trainees needed time to put the 
training in context, opportunity to practice the concepts, feedback from similarly trained 
peers, and continual reinforcement from management to truly incorporate lessons that 
would endure (ICAO 1989). 
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, a growing number of airlines in the U.S. and 
around the world incorporated Cockpit Resource Management training.  A new 
generation of courses that had an increased emphasis upon team building, briefing 
strategies, situational awareness, stress management and incorporated specific modules 
on risk-based decision-making strategies to break chains of errors were becoming 
prevalent.  In accordance with a focus not just upon the cockpit, these courses became 
known as Crew Resource Management (Helmreich 1999).  CRM training continues to be 
used by virtually all the major airlines and throughout all military aviation, though each 
service still refers to the training slightly differently, as well as within the Coast Guard as 
a whole.  There, it is known as CRM for aviation in-flight operations, Maintenance 
Resource Management (MRM) for aviation ground crews and Team Coordination 
Training (TCT) for all personnel serving in cutters, on boats, and conducting marine 
safety and security activities. 
E. EXAMPLES OF CRM SUCCESS WITHIN THE MILITARY 
The following military CRM examples highlight how CRM facilitated the success 
or lack there-of, in the involved operations.  As with the ORM examples, these operations 
involved hazardous and dynamic situations, much like many of the missions to which 
HLDS responders could be called. 
21 
1. A USCG Long Range Success 
A USCG C-130 “Hercules” search-and-rescue aircraft got a call to prepare to 
search for a missing 30-year-old man in a 12-foot kayak, reported to be near a remote 
island in the Area of Responsibility, approximately four hours flying time.  The C-130 
was loaded with the maximum 62,000-pound fuel load, providing about 12 hours of flight 
time.  
During the preflight planning, the crew contacted the District Command Center-
Rescue Coordination Center (RCC).  The crew discussed a number of search and flight 
options and departed on the mission, knowing that once they flew beyond the point where 
they could return directly to the airstation, they committed to landing at the nearby 
island’s primitive airport.  No other divert options were available.  However, at flight-
time, the crew had not obtained confirmation through the RCC that the destination airport 
was operational. 
After takeoff, the crew reviewed and modified the RCC-provided search-action 
plan.  Later, the crew received information indicating that the airport lights were working 
and that fuel had been arranged.  
Upon arrival on-scene, weather and sea conditions were good.  The crew dropped 
a datum-marker buoy to get drift information.  The aircraft’s search radar was 
intermittent, operating five to 10 percent of the time and greatly reducing the probability 
of detection.  The navigator and avionicsman worked continuously to get and keep the 
radar up, successfully getting a few minutes at a time of active radar searching. 
Darkness was falling as the C-130 completed all of the original search area, the 
perimeter of the islands, and a trackline search out 60 miles from the islands in the 
direction a drifting kayak would travel.  The crew rapidly worked together to plan and 
prepare for another search area they had developed to the west of the original search area 
but realized they were running out of time to find the kayaker.  Another night adrift 
would result in a larger search area the next day.  More importantly, it meant the kayaker 
would spend another day exposed to the elements, perhaps without food or water. 
During the second search, the crew had discussed that fact that they had only five 
minutes remaining (one more 10-mile leg) before they would have to depart because of 
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darkness.  On that last leg, the radar came up for a few minutes, and the navigator saw a 
small blip before the radar again failed.  However the C-130 continued toward the radar 
target and as they approached, the copilot, yelled out, "There he is; he's flashing a light."  
Flying over, the crew could just make out the faint outline of the kayak and the man on 
board.  Unfortunately, because darkness had set in, neither he nor the kayak were visible 
when the C130 again passed over a few minutes later. 
An MA-1 survival kit, which included a raft, was made ready.  The raft could 
provide a safe place if the kayak overturned or sank and was equipped with a survival 
radio.  The kit was dropped a few minutes later but, because of darkness, it was difficult 
to tell if it was close to the kayak. 
The crew relayed the latest information to the RCC and was told there was a 
tugboat in the area.  After the crew directly contacted and requested that the skipper of 
the tugboat divert to pick up the kayaker, the C130 orbited, dropping illumination flares 
to provide a visual reference for the life raft.  Within an hour, the tugboat was nearby and 
was vectored to the raft.  The kayaker had abandoned his kayak and boarded the life raft 
shortly after the aerial delivery; the tugboat located the man in the raft and brought him 
and the raft safely on board.  As the C130 departed the scene to land at the nearby island, 
the tugboat skipper said if the aircraft had not remained on-scene to guide him, it would 
have been impossible to locate the raft. 
As the C130 neared the island after the 10 hours of flight time, the crew was 
unable to tune in or identify the island’s non-directional beacon, the only navigational aid 
at the airport.  They were also unable to contact any airport personnel until they were 
about 50 miles out with the time now approximately 2330.  At 10 miles out, they spoke to 
someone at the field, located in a remote portion of the island, and were informed that 
there was no lighting at the airport and that the non-directional-beacon antenna had 
blown down during a recent storm.  Upon hearing this, the C130’s flight deck got very 
quiet.  The crew would have to identify the field and land without navigational aids or 
any surface lighting.  They had to fly an approach into a black hole, in the rain, with a 
cloud deck at 700 feet, with no navigational aids.  However, they had no other options at 
this point regarding diversion to another field. 
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The airport indicated that it had two old fire trucks parked with headlights pointed 
down the runway.  On a first pass, the C130 crew could not see the airport or any sign of 
the trucks.  The crew did everything possible to find the runway.  The copilot called out 
altitude and airspeed; the navigator monitored and adjusted the GPS (uncertified for 
approaches) to provide a course to the runway heading.  The avionicsman handled radio 
traffic with the RCC and the crew in the back of the aircraft readied everything for a 
rough landing.  At the end of the second pass, the copilot saw a faint red glow to the left 
of the aircraft.  Turning in that direction, the small, old fire trucks, probably from the 
1950s or 1960s, became visible.  Although they did not put out any appreciable light the 
pilot was able to make out what appeared to be the first 50 feet of the runway threshold.  
The C130 turned downwind on the go-around and once again reentered the clouds before 
making its run into what was believed to be the field.  With continuous communication 
between the crew, the pilot controlled altitude and airspeed during the descent, while the 
co-pilot provided visual references.  Nearing what they believed to be the field, the C-
130’s landing lights were turned on.  The lights had been left off because when they were 
on, nothing but gray haze and rain was visible on the windscreen.  As they flew over the 
trucks, the pilot flared the aircraft and touched down.  Full reverse and firm braking were 
applied and the C130 safely landed.  The C130 departed from the island the following 
afternoon and safely made it back to the airstation. 
A post-flight review of this case clearly indicated that both the successful search 
and the rescue effort as well as the “routine” landing were successful primarily because 
of the CRM skills, especially communications, leadership, and decision-making, that 
were exercised by the crew (Sultzer 2003).  
2.  Scheduling a Naval Aviation Mishap 
A Navy helicopter (SH-60) command put "all the necessary links in place" for a 
mishap.  Despite a squared-away squadron, with a proactive safety program, it easily fell 
prey to not paying attention to the business at hand.  Only the heads-up use of CRM skills 
prevented an actual mishap from occurring. 
On a Thursday afternoon before a long weekend, a Navy helicopter command 
received a request regarding the need for transport of several machine guns and 
associated hardware from one Naval Air Station to another to support a Weapons and 
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Tactics Instructor course the following Tuesday.  The tasking was straightforward but as 
the word filtered down, the urgency to do the mission ratcheted up. 
The distance to be traveled was only 600 miles, a one-leg flight for a fixed-wing 
aircraft.  But for the helicopters involved -- SH-60B’s -- on a good day with good winds 
it would be about a five-hour, two-leg flight with one stop for fuel.  With any headwind, 
such a flight could end up requiring three legs and two fuel stops.  Although weather was 
not really an issue, the various factors involved meant that the helicopters would have to 
fly visible flight restriction (VFR)-only, stay at or near a 10,000 foot ceiling, traverse 
unfamiliar mountainous terrain to an unfamiliar destination, and use a junior aircrew. 
On Friday morning, the requirement to get the guns to the distant NAS was still 
valid.  The operations officer had also determined that commercial-overnight delivery 
and the airstation's C-12 were not viable options to move the gear.  After a mid-morning 
discussion, the ops officer, with naval aviator “can do,” said the command could do it 
with the scheduled aircrew and aircraft.  All this transpired through the morning as the 
command worked "important squadron issues."  
While the command had initially assumed that the aircrew would remain 
overnight after the delivery and return the next day, the aircrew, which consisted of a 
newly designated helicopter aircraft commander (HAC), a slightly more seasoned HAC 
as copilot, and a junior aircrewman, wanted to fly there and return the same day.  The 
command reluctantly approved this flight schedule as all involved had the best intentions 
to get the job done.   
The aircrew planned and filed the mission to get the gear there and fly back the 
same day.  Due to some aircraft issues, the preflight checks were completed just before 
noon --approximately 90 minutes behind the originally scheduled launch; however, the 
crew pressed on.  Shortly after that, the squadron CO walked out of his office and 
bumped into the aircrew milling about rather oddly in the hallway.  They had come back 
into the squadron to reevaluate the entire mission.  After getting set in the aircraft and 
getting ready to "start engines" on the checklist, they had a feeling in the pit of their 
stomachs that all was not right, causing them to return to the squadron bay.  They felt the 
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overall planning was poor and the CO's reluctant approval of the mission was even 
worse.  They felt a “time out” was needed. 
The CO cancelled the mission on the spot.  Upon closer discussion with the 
distant NAS, it was learned that the guns were needed no later than close of business on 
Tuesday.  The mission was successfully rescheduled for an early start on Tuesday with an 
overnight and return on Wednesday. 
Because of “can do”-itis, the crew and command both failed to question their 
motivation, did not examine the eventual course of action, and did not appropriately 
make good risk decisions.  However, the crew’s other CRM skills came into play as 
situational awareness and assertiveness forced them and the command to reexamine the 
situation before a potential mishap could be initiated (Gillcrest 2002). 
3. A USCG Search Astray - Revisited 
Re-examining the third example from the above chapter on ORM, the USCG 
search effort that resulted in the MLB grounding, one of the other primary causal factors 
noted during the investigation was the failure by the crew and the chain of command to 
utilize CRM skills (or more precisely TCT skills for the boat crew).  Of particular 
relevance to this thesis, the investigation’s discussion of this causal factor directly 
intertwines with use of CRM skills as a primary basis for ORM to be employed.  
Although ORM was utilized initially prior to the departure of the MLB on the case and 
on-scene after the initial grounding, the opportunity for the coxswain and crew (and the 
chain of command) to properly employ ORM – and likely prevent the mishap -- would 
have occurred during the team-based decision-making and communications that should 
have been facilitated as part of a purposeful application of CRM.  The fact that they 
failed to use CRM resulted in a similar failure to effectively use ORM, ultimately 
resulting in the mishap (USCG 2005a). 
F. CRM AND LINKS TO ORM 
The links between CRM and ORM, as discussed in the last example, are currently 
a hot topic throughout military safety staffs.  A recent DOD CRM workgroup’s internal 
benchmarking exercise of the various services’ CRM programs compared and contrasted 
them.  They found that each service had slightly different names for the courses.  All 
26 
required some form of initial and refresher training, though not for all operational 
communities, and each taught a different suite of skills, although each included 
communications and assertiveness (DOD 2005).  These findings were then incorporated 
by the workgroup with information from commercial aviation CRM programs.  From this 
composite set of both military and commercial inputs, the workgroup was able to 
characterize a “typical” CRM course.  It initially takes two to three days with multiple 
instructional approaches that mix lectures, interactive and practical exercises, case 
studies, and multimedia.  Specific topics for an operational community are usually 
established through accident/mishap analysis, subject matter expert interviews, and 
observations of crews in simulators.  There are six core concepts:  team work, leadership, 
situational awareness, decision making, communications, and personal limitations such as 
stress and fatigue.  These are covered with a common skill set that includes:  mission 
analysis, communication/assertiveness, coordination, task management, situational 
awareness, and decision-making/risk management (DOD 2005).  Within the Mission 
Analysis and decision-making/risk management skills, ORM was identified as the key 
tool.  The courses initially educate crews about the limitations of human performance and 
how stressors such as fatigue, emergencies, and work overload can contribute to the 
occurrence of cognitive errors.  A number of operational concepts to help mitigate and 
act as filters for the error process are addressed.  These include:  inquiry (seeking relevant 
operational information), advocacy (communicating proposed actions), conflict 
resolution and the use of risk-based decision making processes, which is where ORM 
plugs in.  The recent DOD working group best captured this relationship by noting that 
“ORM is a tool embedded in decision making and mission analysis.  CRM is the human 
factors skill set that will enhance the application of ORM.  Failures in the CRM skill set 
could lead to inefficient ORM” (DOD 2005). 
CRM prepares a team for operational performance with the knowledge that 
mistakes will inevitably be made.  It then facilitates the use of tools, such as ORM, that 
simultaneously reduce both the risk of occurrence of such mistakes and the consequences 
when they do.  This critical linkage between ORM as tools and processes with CRM as 
the team-oriented training that provides the skill set to best employ ORM had long been 
apparent to the aviation components of the DOD services and within the Coast Guard.  
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Notably, non-aviation components within the military cited the existence of this linkage 
as well but until recently had not implemented community-wide programs to integrate 
ORM via CRM training.  As implied by the work of the DOD working group, the 
consistent integration of ORM into CRM training for all military services and all 
communities is a likely path to be taken in the future. 
G. CRM SUCCESS PREDICTS HLDS RESPONDER SUCCESS 
CRM, adopted by a multitude of professions and industries besides the military 
(Salas 2003), has a 25-plus year record of proven success in helping operators prevent 
catastrophic events caused by human error (IAFC 2003).  These successes include 
anesthesiologists (Howard 1992), air traffic controllers, the nuclear power industry 
(Harrington 1993), aviation maintenance (Marx 1994), the offshore oil and gas industry 
(Flin 1997), and within merchant fleets.  Exemplifying its success is the Danish maritime 
and shipping company Maersk, in which CRM has been in place for their mariners since 
1994 and for their rig crews since 1997.  Maersk’s accident rate decreased from one 
major accident per 30 ship years in 1992 to one major accident per 90 ship years in 1996, 
a three-fold reduction; additionally, by the beginning of 1998, all insurance premiums 
had been reduced by 15 % from their levels in 1992.  These results were largely 
attributed to the combined use of CRM and simulator training (Byrdorf 1998).  
CRM provokes the changes within an organization required to reduce accidents 
(Mearns 2003) and has a demonstrated track record of enhancing safety and improving 
productivity within sets of tasks where teamwork is important.  The HLDS response 
community should receive a similar benefit from its integration.  Within this community, 
particularly in firefighting, a number of pioneers and innovators are currently pushing 
initiatives to integrate CRM principles.  The International Association of Fire Chiefs 
(IAFC) used a top-level team from the aviation industry, the International Association of 
Fire Fighters, and command officers from all types of fire departments in conjunction 
with successful CRM practitioners from the U.S. Coast Guard and other military aviation 
components to craft a CRM introduction guide for the fire service (IAFC 2003).  The 
National Wildfire Coordinating Group has developed an introductory training program on 
CRM principles for the line firefighter.  Several forward-leaning fire departments such as 
the Campbell County (WY) Fire Department (Lubnau 2004) and Phoenix (AZ) Fire and 
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Rescue have adopted and integrated CRM programs (Rubin 2005).  A number of others, 
including Atlanta Fire and Rescue, are readying CRM instruction for their crews and 
there have been calls within the firefighting community for universal adoption of CRM 
(Rubin 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e, 2002a, 2002b).  Although there is little data 
yet available, CRM appears to be a successful approach within the fire service, one that 
will only receive more attention and emphasis (Rubin 2005). 
H. SUMMARY 
The safety risk management process called for by the RAND/NIOSH report, like 
other risk management processes, requires recognition, evaluation, and control of risks to 
HLDS responders.  The principles of ORM -- not to accept unnecessary risk (and 
accordingly, to take necessary risks based on expected benefit), to ensure accountability 
for risk decisions, and to incorporate the risk management process via both planning and 
execution -- are strongly aligned with RAND/NIOSH’s specific requirements for HLDS 
responders.  The successful use of ORM by military responders to balance risks and 
mission completion in hazardous, highly dynamic environments indicates that it should 
be similarly effective for HLDS responders. 
Whether referred to as Cockpit Resource Management, Aircrew Resource 
Management, Maintenance Resource Management, Team Coordination Training, or most 
commonly, Crew Resource Management, the application of human factors research to 
training and operations within the commercial and military aviation sector has 
significantly improved safety and effectiveness.  ORM can be a key tool within a “state-
of-the-art” CRM course to synergistically reduce both the probability of mistakes and the 
severity of consequences when they do occur.  Successful applications of CRM within 
other military, medical, commercial maritime, and oil production communities provide 
mounting evidence of CRM’s ability to dramatically improve teamwork and facilitate the 
use of all available resources to achieve safe and efficient operations.  Building upon its 
success for firefighters, other HLDS responders should expect to reap similar benefits. 
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III. BENCHMARKING SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT 
A. BENCHMARKING 
As noted previously, within the context of the strategic planning cycle, the 
RAND/NIOSH report clarified the mandate and identified the stakeholders, their 
missions, and their values.  These can subsequently be used within the next step of the 
strategic planning cycle, analysis.  For this thesis, benchmarking is the primary analytical 
tool.  
By definition, a benchmark is a point of reference for a measurement.  The term 
originated from the chiseled horizontal marks that surveyors made into which an angle-
iron could be placed to set a leveling rod, thus ensuring that the leveling rod could be 
repositioned in the exact same place in the future.  When used in a management and 
strategic planning context, benchmarking refers to a process in which organizations 
evaluate various aspects of their processes in relation to other organizations or an 
accepted best practice, with the ultimate aim of developing plans on how to adopt and 
integrate such best practices. 
Selection of an organization or organizations that exhibit best practice is a key 
element to benchmarking.  In this case, the RAND/NIOSH report provides a relatively 
clear and direct indication that the military was expected to provide the best practice for 
Homeland Defense and Security (HLDS) responder safety risk management.  In 
particular the military’s emphasis on force protection, preserving “its force's fighting 
strength by protecting individual servicemen and women against the threat of enemy 
action and by taking steps to minimize the effect of hazards on unit effectiveness, 
readiness, and morale,” is applicable to the HLDS responder community.  “Sustainability 
becomes key: Incidents must be managed with an eye on ensuring the readiness of 
response organizations to meet future challenges” (Jackson 2004, pg. 1). 
For this thesis, two military services, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S. 
Navy (USN), were selected for benchmarking risk management process.  These two 
services were chosen because the USCG is the only service to currently integrate 
Operational Risk Management (ORM) within Crew Resource Management (CRM); the 
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USN’s mission set is closest to the USCG’s – both are naval services; and the USN’s risk 
management approach very closely mirrors that of the other DOD services. 
B. MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
The definition of benchmarking also indicates that a measurement scheme is 
involved in the analytical process.  Such a scheme looks at output or outcomes of the 
process in question.  For this thesis, measurement issues are concerned with the safety of 
operations within the benchmarked organizations. 
A recent study conducted for the Coast Guard examined the state of safety 
performance measurement in industry and government.  It captured the perspectives of 15 
consultants, 6 academicians, 11 industry representatives and 6 government agencies, 
many of whom were associated with nationally recognized safety programs (ABS Group 
2000).  In determining what information a safety measurement system should provide, 
the authors borrowed heavily from a 1997 study in which 21 subject matter experts in 
behavioral safety research were asked to identify essential properties, essential results, 
and other features of the best safety programs (Sulzer-Azaroff 1999).  The below ranked 
list outlines these expectations:  
1. Lowered incident rates - lower frequency of mishaps, injuries, near 
misses, and property damage. 
2. Increased safety performance - compliance with safety protocols and 
decreases in unsafe practices. 
3. Reduced costs - continuous downward trend, benefits outweigh costs of 
interventions. 
4. Maintenance - permanence of results after change in personnel (i.e., driven 
by the culture of the organization) 
5. Acceptance - commitment to safety; safety becomes an integral part of 
business plan and results; all personnel play active role in improving 
safety culture 
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6. Broad application - personnel can deal with other safety and health 
challenges; increased hazard abatement; use of technological 
improvements to reduce/mitigate risk 
7. Rapid follow-up on safety suggestions and on work orders 
8. Increased reporting of near misses and property damage-accuracy and 
willingness to elaborate 
9. Increased positive reinforcement skills (Sulzer-Azaroff 1999)  
As the ABS study noted, safety metrics may be quantitative or qualitative. 
Quantitative metrics may include, but are not limited to, numerical counts, percentages, 
and rates.  Qualitative metrics may include, but are not limited to, descriptive ratings of 
effectiveness and efficiency, and the categorization of activity.  Some examples of these 
metrics appear below in Table 1. 
 
Quantitative Metrics Qualitative Metrics 
Number of job safety analyses 
performed 
Effectiveness of safety training (initial and 
refresher) 
Frequency of peer behavioral 
observations 
Type of interventions developed through 
observation processes 
Participation of employees on audit 
teams 
Value of safety suggestions 
Number of safety suggestions 
submitted 
Effectiveness of safety committees 
Participation of leaders in training Reliability of peer observations as measured 
by a second observer 
Increase in percent safe behavior 
observed 
Employee perceptions of incident 
investigation procedures 
Time-to-closure on safety action items  
Table 1. Summary of Safety Metrics - From (McClintock 1999) 
 
The ABS study also found that safety measurements can generally be categorized 
into outcome measures, process measures, and motivation assessments (ABS Group 
2000).  Outcome metrics are the most common way to compare performance between 
organizations and among business units within an organization.  For safety, outcome 
measures are primarily concerned with losses and potential loss sequences.  These are 
almost universally used because safety is a prevention activity and accordingly has 
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associated difficulties in determining what and how to measure events that did not 
happen.  Safety success is focused on not having any results, hence only failures to the 
process actually get measured.  Process metrics provide information about the results 
(i.e., effectiveness or quality of effort) and activity (i.e., efficiency or amount of effort) 
within the safety program, while motivational assessments provide information about 
underlying factors within the organizational culture that facilitate or inhibit safety 
processes (ABS Group 2000).  Each measurement type provides a different perspective 
on safety performance.  To understand why a safety program performs at its current level 
and how it might improve, an organization can use a combination of these three 
measurement types to create a multidimensional set of proactive measures.  Such an 
approach captures how often processes are used, the levels of risk encountered, the 
various risk control measures employed, and provides comparisons between actual safety 
results and the expected risk.  Within such a construct, the stochastic nature of risk 
management also needs to be accounted for.  Metrics that are commonly used as outcome 
surrogates or are included as part of such a comprehensive scorecard include:  safety 
audit results, standards and checklist compliance, safety and risk management training 
participation, completion of hazard condition reports and the relative activity of safety 
boards, councils, and committees.  
Because there is also a direct, research-proven link between proper execution of 
safety management system elements and the control of severely disabling injuries, closely 
monitoring the elements of a safety management system is another approach used for 
safety measurement (Grimaldi 1989).  These elements include: Mishap investigation and 
analysis  
• Leadership and administration - participation, vision, goals and standards, 
business plans, audits 
• Communication - marketing and recognition 
• Health controls, including personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
Occupational Medical Monitoring Program 
• Safety committee requirements 
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• Engineering controls, both design and process 
• Manager and employee training 
• Organizational rules, task analysis and procedures, and task observations 
• Hiring and placement requirements 
• Emergency preparedness 
• Purchasing controls, including contractor safety and hazardous materials 
• Planned facility/equipment inspections (Bird 1990) 
Clearly, sophisticated measurement schemes that incorporate and integrate all of 
the many available sources of safety information -- a comprehensive risk management 
information system (RMIS) -- would be useful, indeed almost necessary, to link goals 
with outcomes.  Unfortunately, the use of RMIS is not yet common and the military 
organizations benchmarked in this thesis are only now developing them.  A recent high-
level study of USCG SEH risk and compliance practices provides a sense of the current 
state of RMIS within the military, concluding that the existing systems are inadequate.  
This report specifically found that: 
• The existing inventory of specialty electronic and paper-based compliance 
tools are essentially un-integrated and non-scalable 
• There is a lack of software application development standards for 
contingencies, succession planning, system testing and validation 
• Aggregate data is not readily available to every level within the chain of 
command to assist in risk assessment and mitigation program 
prioritization 
• Inadequate tools exist for assessing effectiveness in use of operational risk 
management (ORM), ORM training, and for documenting and sharing 
critical risk information (ICS 2005)  
For the military, and apparently for almost all of the federal government, the only 
universally accepted measure that is used to compare relative effectiveness of different 
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risk management processes is the mishap or accident rate, e.g. number of incidents 
(usually lost work time is used as the standard within general industry) per 100 personnel.  
This rate is usually normalized with the expectation that personnel work 2000 hours per 
year; however, this means that populations with differing work patterns, i.e. military and 
civilian personnel with 24/7 readiness as opposed to a “normal” 40 hour work, are 
sometimes difficult to compare.  For the military, another common method of 
normalizing the raw number of mishaps is to use platform hours, i.e. flight hours for 
aircraft and underway hours for ships or boats, or the actual number of platforms 
involved, i.e. number of ships.  Again, this creates difficulties when making comparisons 
across communities and organizations.   
Another issue with this “simple” measure involves the actual definition of 
mishaps.  All of the military services use a tiered system from Class “A”, the most 
serious, to Class “D”, the most common, minor mishap.  However, the specific definition 
of those classes is highly dependent upon both the service and the community within that 
service.  For example, within the Navy, a Class “B” mishap is one in which “Reportable 
property damage is $200,000 total cost of or more, but less than $1,000,000; an injury 
and/or occupational illness results in permanent partial disability; or when five or more 
personnel are inpatient hospitalized” (USN 1997).  Within the U.S. Coast Guard, a Class 
“B” mishap is one in which “(1) Any injury and/or occupational illness results in 
permanent partial disability; (2) The resulting cost of reportable property damage, or 
damage to cutters and aircraft, is $200,000 or more, but less than $1,000,000; (3) Three 
or more personnel are inpatient hospitalized; (4) Coast Guard small boats incur repairable 
damage of $50,000 or more” (USCG 2005b).  Although similar, the subtle differences – 
three hospitalizations vs. five, boats treated differently -- could mean that an incident in 
one service would be not be classified the same way in the other.  Another relevant 
example of definitional differences is at the Class “C” level in which “lost work time 
incidents” – the incident level most commonly used for benchmarking in general industry 
and across the federal government – are lumped together in the Coast Guard with all 
groundings, fires, and persons in the water, regardless of whether any injuries were 
involved.  Although most accident reporting systems, including the Coast Guard’s, are 
sufficiently sophisticated to separate out lost-work-time incidents from these other 
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mishaps, the standardized reports used by the various services often do not make such 
distinctions.  This occurs for the sake of simplicity and year-to-year consistency.  For 
Class “D” mishaps, the differences between services can be even more pronounced.  Due 
to these potential confounders, for the purposes of this thesis, the Class “A” mishap rate, 
which is nearly identical across the military services in terms of definition, is used as a 
means of comparison.  Also, because of community differences, i.e. aviation vs. afloat vs. 
shore, etc. any specific comparisons that a reader may infer from the mishaps rates should 
be applied only between like sets of operators.   
C. U.S. COAST GUARD:  AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
1. Background 
The successful linkage between CRM and effective risk management, e.g. ORM – 
and one that is particularly relevant to the multi-dimensional HLDS response community 
– can be seen in the U.S. Coast Guard’s use of CRM, Maintenance Resource 
Management (MRM) ) – a CRM derivative -- and Team Coordination Training (TCT) -- 
another CRM derivative.  As noted in the examples previously, CRM is used by Coast 
Guard Aviators for flight related operations, MRM is used by Coast Guard Aviation 
personnel for Ground Operations, and TCT is used by personnel on Coast Guard cutters, 
on boats, and while conducting marine safety activities.  Each has a separate training 
program and populations that receive the training but they all share similar training 
objectives and use ORM within the context of human factors-based team training.  For 
the purposes of this section, each of these CRM and CRM-derived training systems used 
by the Coast Guard – CRM, MRM, and TCT – is collectively referred to as CRM; 
although specific uses of TCT or MRM are also referred to separately.  CRM, with ORM 
integrated as the primary decision-making tool, is used throughout the entire service for 
crews conducting search and rescue, law enforcement, and pollution response. 
Captain Walter Hanson, formerly the Chief of Afloat Safety within the Coast 
Guard’s Office of Safety and Environmental Health and primary author of the Coast 
Guard’s current TCT and ORM directives, and his assistant, Lieutenant Commander 
Dennis Becker, primary architect of the Coast Guard TCT training system, explained 
some of the decisions associated with the Coast Guard’s implementation of CRM.  They 
indicated that similar to the history of CRM within the commercial and military aviation, 
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the decision to implement such programs within the Coast Guard was initially based on a 
number of accident analyses of aircraft and navigational mishaps.  The National 
Transportation Safety Board reports and internal Coast Guard Mishap Analysis Reports 
of major incidents, including the collision of the Cutter CUYAHOGA, the collision of the 
Cutter BLACKTHORNE, the sinking of the buoytender MESQUITE, and the loss of life 
during the towing of the Fishing Vessel SEA KING, specifically noted breakdowns in 
key team coordination skills, including risk management.  GAO audits also indicated that 
the Coast Guard could better employ risk management as a means to minimize mishaps 
while maximizing efficiency (Becker 2005). 
The Coast Guard initially looked at CRM training in 1983.  John Fox, an internal 
Performance Consultant, completed a Front End Analysis (FEA) that examined CRM 
training needs for the Coast Guard.  The result of this FEA was Human Error Accident 
Reduction Training (HEART).  While it was well received by the few units to which it 
was given, HEART turned out to have very limited impact because no service-wide 
training infrastructure was ever developed to disseminate it.  The results of the FEA and 
lessons learned from the limited HEART training were later combined with other CRM 
research and activities.  These included the landmark University of Texas research on 
CRM in the 1970’s; the implementation of CRM within the commercial aviation 
industry; and the extensive research and workshops conducted by Geis and Alvarado on 
Vessel Resource Management and Bridge Resource Management in the 1980’s using 
maritime bridge simulators.  In particular, Geis and Alvarado’s work was used to 
formulate the prototype of TCT in 1993.  Captain Hanson then expanded upon this 
prototype at a 1995 workshop of Commanding Officers by asking the gathered CO’s the 
question “What skills are most critical to effective teamwork?”  The prototype and the 
input from the CO’s were used to derive the seven critical skills currently taught within 
TCT.  These skills were also mapped to the Coast Guard’s aviation-based CRM skill set 
(Becker 2005). 
2. Integration of ORM and CRM 
Concurrent to ongoing development of TCT and CRM was an interest by the 
Coast Guard and all military services in ORM and other forms of risk-based decision-
making.  Within the Coast Guard, Lieutenant Commander Becker, Captain Hanson, 
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Captain Hanson’s replacement, Commander Ricky George, as well as several Aviation 
Safety Chiefs and the Aviation Training Center in Mobile, AL, were involved with both 
CRM and ORM implementation efforts.  Their collective experiences led them to 
appreciate that ORM alone would not suffice.  They believed that the critical skills of 
CRM were also needed, noting that that ORM, if trained on alone, couldn’t provide a 
context for consistent application of ORM tools.  They concluded that developing a 
standalone ORM programs would be less efficient and likely less effective.  This was a 
significant leap from the existing level of organizational ORM implementation in the 
other military services.  As discussed in the next section, the Navy (and the Marine 
Corps, Air Force and Army) clearly understood the value of ORM; however, they looked 
at ORM as a separate training program and did not attempt to link it to the human factors-
based team concepts of CRM or TCT.  Instead of simply requiring additional training, the 
implementation strategy of Coast Guard leaders revolved around making it difficult for 
units and personnel to not use ORM as part of their daily activities.  Requiring the use of 
ORM through a specific policy, while simultaneously providing the process and tools to 
meet these requirements via the existing and successful CRM training programs, 
facilitated this goal.  The scenario-based approach of CRM imparted skills associated 
with successful accomplishment of everyday activities.  Making ORM the primary 
decision making tool within this construct allowed it to be better understood and it 
became second nature to participants (Becker 2005). 
A key lesson learned and used to improve the Coast Guard’s CRM training 
included the observation that “buy-in” by trainees required that their instructors to have 
similar background and experiences for credibility.  Initial instructional TCT sessions 
with Coast Guard personnel utilized PhD’s and other scientists.  Although the academic 
instructors were certainly experts in human factors and in the science behind the training, 
they were largely ineffective in getting through to students.  Once the training was 
conducted by actual operators who had been given the necessary academic understanding 
and background, the training began to have impact and acceptance.  Currently within the 
Coast Guard, it is actual operators who conduct almost all CRM and TCT training.  A 
large proportion of these instructors are experienced Coast Guard Auxiliarists—the 
volunteer-only operators of the Coast Guard workforce.  Another parameter specific to 
TCT was the combination of a large number of required trainees (approximately 15,000 
personnel on cutters, boats, and marine safety and security activities) with limited 
funding and training resources that necessitated a train-the-trainer approach.  Although 
not directly linked to the decision to integrate the training programs for TCT and ORM, 
this certainly influenced the desire to reduce redundancies within the training system and 
to seek maximum performance from every training session — an approach that should 
resonate well with much of the HLDS response community (Hanson 2005). 
3. Benchmarking Results 
The Coast Guard used both root cause analysis of mishaps and post-training 
behavioral questionnaires to determine whether the Coast Guard’s CRM approach was 
effective.  Mishaps of interest were examined for relevant changes in human factors 
contributions as compared to a baseline that had been developed from historical data 
before CRM implementation.  To facilitate such measurements, the Coast Guard had to 
restructure its mishap reporting to better incorporate collection of relevant human factors 
information.  Root cause analyses of mishaps over a four year period showed that overall 
human error was reduced by 15 percent.  The overall mishap rate was also reduced at the 
end of the study period to half of the baseline rate.  Over the same four year study period, 
the behavioral questionnaires sent to individuals trained six months earlier showed a 
gradual increase in use of TCT skills, including application of ORM (Hanson 1996).  The 
consistent citing of ORM, TCT, and CRM as mitigating or preventative factors during 
mishap investigations and in mishap reports was and continues to be another strong 
indicator that they have become part of the Coast Guard’s culture (USCG 2005a).  
Tables 2 and 3 below provide a snapshot of USCG Class A mishap data. 
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Table 2. USCG and DOD Services Class A Aviation Mishap Rates – From USCG 
Fy04 Aviation Safety Report (USCG 2005c) 
 
Afloat Platforms - Class A Mishap Rates per 100,000 Resource Hours
USCG Platform FY02 FY03 FY04
Cutters 0.25 0.23 0.32
Shore-based Boats 0.45 0.00 0.00  
Table 3. USCG Class A Afloat Mishap Rates - Adapted from USCG FY02, FY03, 
and FY04 Afloat Safety Reports (USCG 2003, 2004, 2005d) 
 
Within the Coast Guard, mishap rates for all classes of mishaps continue to have a 
downward trend.  A specific link between this trend and the impact of CRM and ORM 
was identified in a recent workshop organized by the International Association of Fire 
Chiefs to examine the potential for CRM’s use in the fire service.  The workshop 
examined mishap rates before and after the Coast Guard introduced CRM and TCT in the 
late 1980’s, finding that incident rates across the entire service had declined in 2002 by 
74% (IAFC 2003).  As seen in table 3 above, the cutter fleet experienced a higher rate of 
Class A mishaps in FY04.  However, much of this rise is attributable to the need to 
maintain the third oldest fleet in the world.  The Commandant of the Coast Guard, 
Admiral Thomas Collins, recently noted, “If you count the major maritime nations of the 
world and their navies and coast guards, we are 39 out of 41 in terms of having the oldest 
fleet on this planet” (Miles 2004).  Despite the serious maintenance issues, Class A 
mishaps for cutters remain relatively low, well within a standard deviation from the three 
year average, and are not associated with serious injuries.  Mr. Albert Kotz, the current 
Chief of the USCG’s Office of Safety and Environmental Health, and Rear Admiral Paul 
Higgins, the Director for the USCG’s Heath and Safety Directorate both attribute the 
falling rates and the four-plus year span without operational fatalities to the consistent 
application of ORM within the context of CRM and TCT skill sets.   
D. U.S. NAVY:  A SEPARATE PIECE 
1. Background and Approach 
The USN formally introduced ORM in 1997, two years before the USCG.  
Although the naval aviation community had extensive experience with CRM and risk 
management, the senior naval service elected to pursue ORM implementation primarily 
by directly training personnel on ORM skills and use of ORM tools. 
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The Navy's ORM instruction, originally issued in 1997 and modified most recently in 
2004, describes an approach to ORM as follows: 
[ORM] provides a means to define risk and control it where 
possible...Every operation, both on and off-duty, requires some degree of 
decision-making that includes risk assessment and risk management. The 
naval vision is to develop an environment where every leader, Sailor, 
Marine and civilian is trained and motivated to personally manage risk in 
everything they do, thus completing all operations with minimum risk 
(USN 2004, pg. 2). 
This instruction directs the Navy to train all personnel, commensurate with rank, 
experience, and leadership position.  It incorporates ORM into leadership courses, 
General Military Training (GMT), and in specific courses that address operational 
employment, safety, or force protection; as well as integrating ORM into fleet tactical 
training, Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS), Naval and Occupational Standards, 
Individual Training Systems, and the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation 
System.  The instruction recommends that each of the major type commanders 
(TYCOMS) should, as appropriate, issue an implementing instruction to augment this 
policy, including “command-specific applications and requirements."  The lead TYCOM 
for Naval Aviation, Air Command Pacific (AIRPAC) took the most significant action, 
issuing a July 2001 policy message for the Navy's aviation community with the stated 
goal of "institutionalizing ORM for the aviation force." (USN 2001) This policy further 
stated that: 
ORM is not just a program for safety officers. While [safety officers] have 
become our subject matter experts, operators are actually in the best 
position to apply risk management principles to the evolution at hand 
(USN 2001). 
Although the AIRPAC approach could have integrated ORM via existing CRM 
constructs, the service-wide approach by the USN attempted to provide ORM as separate 
training.  This was likely due to the absence of CRM or a CRM-analogue within the USN 
afloat community and Marine Corps.   
Figure 3 below outlines the most current approach to ORM within the Navy. 
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ORM and the Fleet ORM (OPNAVINST 3500.39B)
Instruction available on NSC website.
Governs use of ORM throughout the Fleet
“SHOULD” to “SHALL”
COURS ES
Curriculum. CNET, NSC, and NAVOSHTRACEN courses incorporate ORM into curricula.
Training. Aviation, Afloat, and Submarine survey teams provide ORM refresher training upon 
request.  Aviation, Afloat, and Submarine safety officer schools provide instructor-level ORM training.
PCO/PXO/DH schools, DIVO training, and Senior Enlisted Academy provide training.
ON-LINE
On-Line Training. Offered through CNAF’s ORM University and USMC MarineNet.  Resources 
available on NSC website.  Total Risk Assessment and Control System (TRACS) & U.S. Army Motor 
Vehicle Risk Assessment Tool (ASMIS).
ORM Works!
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Transition to RM a Must.




ORM Introduced to Fleet
Av iation Mishap Rates Declining
Afloat and Submarine Communities Show Improvements
Works- but is not institutionalized!
MIS HAP RATES
 
Figure 3 ORM Briefing Slide – From (Brooks 2005a) 
 
In this briefing slide, Read Admiral Richard Brooks, the current Chief of the Navy Safety 
Center, clearly indicates that ORM is working, but has not been institutionalized or 
integrated.   
This finding was also noted by the most recent (2002) Center for Naval Analysis 
(CNA) evaluation of the Navy’s ORM program.  It found that at the time, ORM had only 
significantly impacted small pockets of the Navy, with those almost exclusively within 
the aviation community, and that ORM integration generally had not become part of the 
culture as is desired by Navy leadership.  In particular, the report indicated that ORM’s 
integration into Navy-wide training requirement is a work in progress.  Personnel at the 
various levels and commands agreed that in order to achieve the desired cultural change, 
ORM training needs a strong and continual presence in the training pipeline.  But the 
Center for Naval Education and Training (CNET) has not yet outlined clear expectation, 
curriculum, or measurement schemes for ORM, nor do they control all the curricula 
within the various service-wide training locations. This report also noted that personnel 
understand what ORM is, but not what they are supposed to do with it.  Many COs don't 
know how to implement ORM on their ships, junior sailors can't relate to it, and senior 
enlisted personnel generally rely on experience and common sense, and thus don't see a 
need for a formal process.  And although ORM faces an uphill battle in gaining 
acceptance, improved efforts by senior leadership could make ORM appeal to a broader 
range of personnel.  The report indicated that Jump-start training is not a long-term 
solution.  The high turnover of personnel dramatically lowers impact of one-time training 
as any proficiency that is gained rapidly "decays."  However, jump-start training 
programs may be the only alternative until ORM is incorporated into the training 
pipeline.  And the CNA explained that ORM is primarily identified with safety and not as 
part of “how business is done.”  All ORM training and information comes only from the 
"safety side,” i.e., the command Safety Office, ship's Safety Officer, Naval Safety Center, 
and Traffic Safety classes.  As a result it will only be seen as a safety program, and will 
not be taken as seriously as it should be. Thus, the Navy will not fully realize the 
potential non-safety benefits (increased efficiency, for example) (Mintz 2002). 
2. Benchmarking Results 
An examination of the Navy (and Marine Corps) Class A mishap rates in Figure 4 
below finds aviation mishap rates that are higher than the Coast Guard’s.  Afloat results 
are more difficult to compare because of normalization differences.  The Coast Guard 
normally measure mishaps per 100,000 operational hours while the Navy measure per 
100 ships.  This is primarily because of the differences in operational use.  Using 5000 as 
an approximation for the “normal” number for operational hours per USCG cutter per 
year, USCG cutter rates are calculated in Table 4.  Comparing these to the USN’s afloat 
rates in Figure 5 indicate that the USN also has higher afloat mishap rates than the cutter 
rate of the USCG.  The USN does not provide separate boat operation statistics and thus 
no comparisons are possible. 
Afloat Platforms - Class A Mishap Rates per 100 Cutters
USCG Platform FY02 FY03 FY04
Cutters 1.26 1.14 1.59  




Figure 4 Navy Aviation Class A Mishap Rates – From (USN 2005) 
 
 
Figure 5 Navy Afloat Class A Mishap Rates – From (USN 2005) 
 
The 2002 CNA report found that units such as AIRPAC (which integrated ORM 
into existing training and standard operating procedures) had mishap rates that were 
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lower than those of other similar commands and that their performance on service-wide 
safety inspections was better.  Of particular note, in consideration of a desire to see ORM 
integrated through CRM, is that human factors continue to be the major cause of Navy 
Class A mishaps, as seen below in Figure 6. 











No. of Class-A Mishaps
Human Error
USN Aviation 120 of 133
Navy Afloat 48 of 51
Non-
HE
13%HE 87%USMC Aviation 62 of 71
USN/USMC, FY98-03
 
Figure 6 Navy Human Errors Statistics - From (Brooks 2005a) 
 
ORM training and implementation have been effective in reducing USN Class A 
mishaps; however, based upon recent statistics, the USCG’s use of ORM within the 
human factor’s-based CRM and TCT training has been even more effective in terms of 
Class A mishaps.  The USN’s high human factor involvement in mishaps, particularly in 
the afloat community, also indicates that an approach, such as CRM or TCT, that focuses 
ORM through a human-factors lens, should make it more valuable in mishap reduction 
efforts.  The Navy has recently come to a similar conclusion and is now undertaking 
efforts to develop a “roadmap for the future and the transition to a stronger safety 
culture” that “incorporates the principles of ORM and the tenets of Crew/Bridge 
Resource Management” (Brooks 2005b).  Their efforts to pursue this objective and the 
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approach taken to achieve the goal should be an excellent source of information and 
inspiration for HLDS responder organizations. 
E. OTHER KEY ISSUES:  LEADERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Examining the similarities and differences in the USCG’s and USN’s 
implementation of ORM highlights a number of key issues.  Leadership and 
accountability standout as areas that need to be considered in any approach taken to 
address HLDS responder safety risk management. 
Bryson defines leadership as the inspiration and mobilization of others to 
undertake collective action in pursuit of the common good.  Clearly this is applicable to 
any organization pursuing development of safety risk management.  Within the USCG, 
the leadership in the Afloat Safety Division of Captain Walt Hanson, Commander Ricky 
George, and Lieutenant Commander Dennis Becker, ensured that TCT was instituted for 
afloat forces and that ORM was woven into that process; hundreds of unit commanders 
then led their personnel in training and using the ORM tools and TCT skills.  USCG 
aviation safety leadership, particularly Captain Dan Abel and Ms. Cathie Zimmerman, 
similarly insisted that ORM be a key decision-making tool within CRM; aviation unit 
commanders similarly championed these skills and tools to ensure their aviators 
employed them.  The collective strategy of the afloat and aviation safety communities – 
make it difficult for USCG personnel to not utilize ORM – guided their efforts.  An 
ability to get support for the programs has ultimately resulted in the low numbers of 
mishaps seen currently across the service.  The USN’s current efforts to institutionalize 
ORM, particularly within a CRM context, would not have occurred without the active 
“inspiration and mobilization” efforts of Rear Admiral Dick Brooks and other key 
members of the Navy Safety Center such as Lieutenant Commander Deborah White and 
Mr. Ted Wirginis.  For HLDS response organization, national level leaders will be 
required to articulate a strategy, develop standards, and obtain resources; lower-tier and 
unit level leadership will be required to champion and facilitate the associated training 
and use of risk management.  Just as Chiefs Alan Brunacini and Dennis Rubin of Phoenix 
and Atlanta respectively have laid the groundwork for CRM within their departments and 
the Nation’s fire service, the collective yet diffuse leadership within other HLDS 
response organizations will be needed to successfully integrate ORM and CRM. 
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Accountability is closely linked to leadership and measurement issues.  Both the 
USN’s and USCG’s implementation efforts for ORM included accountability by units to 
meet training or performance standards, as well as accountability up the various chains of 
command to make adequate resources and training available for implementation efforts.  
Appropriate measurement tools and schemes were critical to determining whether 
personnel, units, or command structures were fulfilling requirements related to ORM and 
CRM.  In both the Navy and the Coast Guard examples, when elements of ORM and 
CRM programs were not measured or when leadership failed to appropriately use the 
measures that did exist, there were subsequent failures in performance that either resulted 
in mishaps or led to near miss situations.  Alternatively, when the organizations made 
certain through accountability that ORM tools and CRM skills were properly used, the 
result was safe, effective completion of missions.  Clearly, HLDS responders must 
implement processes, including measurements, that facilitate and ensure accountability if 
ORM and CRM are to be used effectively for safety risk management. 
F. SUMMARY   
Benchmarking of the USCG’s and USN’s approaches to safety risk management 
brings out key lessons regarding tools, training systems and organizational processes.  
Direct measurement of safety outcomes is highly problematic and despite many 
limitations the only universally accepted measures are accident and injury rates.  ORM 
and CRM training programs must be taught by instructors who have a similar operational 
background and relevant experiences as the trainees.  An integrated approach with ORM 
as a key tool within CRM training was more effective at reducing accidents and injuries 
than separate ORM and CRM training programs.  And leadership and accountability must 
play a crucial role. 
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IV. SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT AND NATIONAL 
PREPAREDNESS 
A. THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS PROCESS 
The President issued HSPD-5 in February, 2003.  It outlined domestic incident 
management requirements and directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
lead a coordinated national effort with other Federal departments and agencies and state, 
local, and tribal entities to establish a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National 
Incident Management System (NIMS).  HSPD-8, a companion to HSPD-5 was released 
later in December of 2003 and described the national preparedness process, requiring 
DHS to again lead a coordinated national effort to develop an all-hazards preparedness 
goal and realign requirements in a wide range of areas to support this goal.  
NIMS provides the Nation’s first responders and authorities with a consistent 
framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, 
size or complexity of the incident.  It creates a foundation for incident management 
regardless of whether the response involves a terrorist attack, a natural disaster, or some 
other emergency.  The NRP is an all-discipline, all-hazards plan for the management of 
domestic incidents. Using the template established by the NIMS, the NRP provides the 
structure and mechanisms to coordinate and integrate incident management activities and 
emergency support functions across Federal, State, local and tribal government entities, 
as well as private sector and non-governmental organizations.  The National Preparedness 
Goal (NPG) establishes readiness priorities, targets, and metrics, answering three key 
questions: “How prepared do we need to be?” “How prepared are we?” and “How do we 
prioritize efforts to close the gap?”  The NPG enables entities across the Nation to more 
easily pinpoint capabilities that need improvement and sustain capabilities at levels 
needed to manage major events using the protocols established by the NRP and NIMS 
(ODP 2005).  In essence, the NRP defines “what” needs to be done to manage a major 
incident, the NIMS defines “how” it needs to be done, and the NPG defines “how well” 
this needs to be done. 
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The NPG uses capabilities-based planning, which asks the following questions to 
help develop and maintain the capabilities to prevent, respond to, and recover from major 
incidents as described in the NRP and NIMS: 
• What should be prepared for?  
• What tasks need to be performed? 
• Under what conditions and to what standards should the tasks be 
performed? 
• Which of these tasks are most critical? 
• What capabilities are required to perform these critical tasks? 
• What levels of these capabilities are necessary? 
• How can the necessary capabilities be developed and maintained? 
• What capabilities does a specific entity need to develop and maintain?  
• How should an entity determine if they have the necessary capabilities? 
• How should an entity allocate resources to maximize impact on 
preparedness? 
B. THE UNIVERSAL TASK LIST (UTL) 
The capabilities-based planning process starts with the use of a wide range of 
possible scenarios that illustrate the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of major 
events that should be prepared for.  Using the all-hazards approach dictated by HSPD-5 
and HSPD-8, these scenarios bound the expected hazards, focusing responder 
examination of capability requirements.  
Based on these National Planning Scenarios, a Universal Task List (UTL) was 
developed to provide a comprehensive menu of tasks to be performed, sorting the tasks 
by scenario, mission, function, and level of government that generally performs the task.  
It identifies the tasks that must be performed under various circumstances within the four 
homeland security mission areas -- Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover -- providing a 
common frame of reference useful for a wide variety of users.  It highlights critical or 
“mission essential” tasks, in which failure will result in the loss of lives or serious 
49 
injuries, or which will jeopardize the ability to accomplish mission-level outcomes  The 
UTL also includes lists of conditions to guide definition of environmental variables that 
may affect task performance, as well as measures of performance and criteria associated 
with each task.  These are used as a guide to define performance standards, consistent 
with mission requirements.  Such standards provide the basis for planning, conducting, 
and evaluating both training and actual operations.  These also provide the foundation for 
training and exercise programs as well as for doctrine development, identification of 
personnel requirements, logistics needs, and interagency and inter-jurisdictional 
coordination. (OSLGCP 2005a)  
Version 2.1 of the UTL uses a taxonomy that first organizes tasks according to the 
four homeland security missions.  Tasks that are found throughout the mission areas, 
such as broad planning, coordination, training, and communication, are cross-identified 
as common tasks.  Next is the objective level which outlines the activities required for 
support of missions.  This level maps the approximately 1,600 unique tasks that will need 
to be performed by Federal, State, local, and tribal jurisdictions and the private sector to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from events.  
In summary, the UTL can be used: 
• to define mission requirements in terms of tasks that must be performed, 
identifying responsible organizations at all levels that play a role in 
performing those tasks 
• to define the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform these tasks, 
providing the basis for training plans, for executing training and for 
planning exercises 
• to define the criteria for assessments of preparedness and for evaluation of 
performance during exercises and real world events 
• to define a common index for sharing lessons learned and best practices 
(OSLGCP 2005a) 
C. THE TARGET CAPABILITIES LIST (TCL) 
The Target Capabilities List (TCL) was developed from the UTL, with each 
capability linking a measurable outcome to one or more critical tasks.  The level -- 
amount and proficiency -- of a capability required from all sources -- Federal, State, 
local, tribal, and private sector – needed to achieve an outcome is also included, as well 
its key attributes, i.e. appropriate measures of effectiveness, supportability, time, 
50 
distance, effect (including scale), and obstacles to be overcome.  Recommended 
combinations of planned, organized, equipped, trained, and exercised personnel 
necessary to achieve an outcome are provided for illustration purposes.  The TCL also 
includes summaries that cut across the scenarios to emphasize different levels of 
capability needed by each level or source (OSLGCP 2005b). 
The TCL is organized in the same taxonomy as the UTL.  Capabilities are 
mapped to missions, objectives, and functions.  Additionally, they are focused upon tiers 
or classes of jurisdictions, allowing for reasonable differences in target levels of 
capability based on characteristics such as total population, population density, and 
critical infrastructure. Another purpose of this tiering is to encourage development of 
mutual aid agreements among neighboring jurisdictions.  The TCL also provides 
guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability that groups of jurisdictions 
are expected to develop and maintain (OSLGCP 2005b). 
Entities at all levels of government use the TCL to determine “gaps” (implying 
that tasks or missions cannot be accomplished with current capabilities); “excesses” 
(unnecessary redundancy exists or a specific capability is no longer needed); and 
“deficiencies” (a capability exists, but is insufficient to meet the target level of 
capability).  This process builds from existing capabilities of entities, enabling all levels 
of government to assess needs, define priorities, and appropriately allocate resources.  
Funding and responsibility for new capabilities is spread among Federal, State, local, 
tribal and private sector entities based on authority and role, as well as factors such as 
required response time, the cost to acquire and maintain a capability, projected frequency 
of use, degree of specialization, and required lead time for research and development.  
(OSLGCP 2005b) 
In summary, the TCL is designed:  
• to assist jurisdictions and agencies in understanding and defining their 
respective roles 
• to outline the capabilities required to perform a specified set of tasks 
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• to indicate where to obtain additional resources if needed 
• to summarize group capability by UTL mission, objective, and function  
D. BUILDING SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT 
As noted previously, building a safety risk management capability via the 
capabilities-based planning process will be vitally important to HLDS response 
organizations.  However, the current limits of the UTL and TCL preclude them from 
being effective guides in this process.  Both the UTL and TCL will require additions and 
modifications if they are to provide appropriate guidance for organizations building 
safety risk management capabilities, especially if they are based on ORM and CRM. 
Within the TCL, only the specific capability of “Worker Health and Safety” is 
relevant to CRM and ORM.  This is described by the TCL as: 
The capability to protect the safety and health of on-scene first responders, 
hospital personnel (first receivers, skilled support personnel and, if 
necessary, their families) through an effective safety and health program 
that includes training, personal protective equipment, health and safety 
planning, risk management practices, medical care, decontamination, 
infection control, adequate work schedule relief, psychological support, 
and follow-up assessments of exposed first responders (OSLGCP 2005b, 
pg. 82). 
It outlines the expected outcome from the capability as: 
No further harm to any first responder, first receiver, hospital staff 
member, or other skilled support personnel due to preventable exposure to 
secondary trauma, chemical release, infectious disease, or physical and 
emotional stress after the initial event or during decontamination and event 
follow-up (OSLGCP 2005b, pg. 82). 
While this expectation certainly aligns with ORM and CRM contributions to an HLDS 
response organization, the TCL and the additional information it includes – “Emergency 
Support Function” and “Annex” references to the NRP, “UTL Critical Tasks”, 
“Capability and Performance Measures”, and “References” -- are not detailed or focused 
towards such a comprehensive approach to safety risk management.  The CPL sections 
on “Equipment and Systems” and “Training” do not presently include requirements for 
either risk management processes or for human factors or risk management training.  
However UTL Task Res.B.1.16.5, “Monitor and Perform Activities Related to Worker 
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Health and Safety”, and the TCL’s “Performance Measures” related to ensuring usage of 
“hazard-based responder safety measures” reflect good interim points for an organization 
to link safety risk management processes to the national capabilities based planning 
model (OSLGCP 2005a, 2005b). 
This review of the national capability-based planning process and it’s 
applicability to safety risk management identified several key issues that align directly 
with those developed distilled from Bryson’s strategic planning process and 
benchmarking.  Most notable of these are measurement, leadership, and accountability.  
Specifically, to build an HLDS organization’s safety risk management capability, the 
TCL’s measures need to add relevant metrics for worker risk levels during operations and 
for evaluating training associated with the ability to apply risk management and team 
coordination skills.  Leadership at both the national and local level is clearly needed to 
influence the continued development of the UTL and TCL such that they include these 
measures as well as training requirements related to risk management and team-based 
training.  And accountability’s link to measurement, as identified previously, is important 
to ensure that safety risk management measures which may be developed and integrated 
into the UTL and TCL are actually applied and used for identifying gaps in required 
capabilities.  The national capabilities-based planning process is likely to become the 
standard for organizations to indicate whether they have met readiness requirements.  
Without inclusion of program requirements and applicable metrics, organizations cannot 
hope to obtain or allocate resources necessary to build a safety risk management 
capability. 
E. SUMMARY 
The national capabilities planning process outlined by HSPD 5 and HSPD 8 align 
Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and non-governmental preparedness, incident 
management, and emergency response plans into a coherent national structure.  While 
clearly this is the process through which HLDS responders should build a safety risk 
management capability based on ORM and CRM, strong leadership is needed to ensure 
the Universal Task List (UTL) and Target Capabilities List (TCL) are refined to provide 
specific measures, guidance, and accountability related to safety risk management. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the RAND/NIOSH report indicates, great opportunity exists to build upon the 
foundation of existing systems and capabilities in order to improve preparedness and 
protect HLDS responders, especially the organizational structures needed to manage 
response safety.  Given that the “emotionally charged, chaotic environment in the 
immediate aftermath of a major disaster is not the time to start working on procedures or 
guidelines to improve responder safety,” the RAND/NIOSH report provides the raw 
materials to begin such critical efforts now.   
RAND/NIOSH mandates development of a safety risk management approach that 
improves responder safety and effectiveness; identifies HLDS responders as 
stakeholders; makes the implicit recommendation to benchmark military risk 
management approaches; and suggests the capabilities-based planning process of HSPD-
5 and HSPD-8 as a potential pathway.  Based on these premises and lessons learned from 
the use of Operational Risk Management (ORM) and Crew Endurance Management 
(CRM) by the Coast Guard and the Navy, this thesis has derived the following key 
recommendations:   
1. HLDS responders should employ ORM as the primary risk tool for 
management of safety.   
2. HLDS responders should incorporate ORM into planning, training, and 
mission execution through CRM.   
3. ORM embedded into CRM skill sets is the most appropriate approach to a 
safety risk management capability. 
4. National and local officials must provide strong leadership 
a. to ensure that safety risk management components, including 
measures and accountability, are included in the HSPD-8 national 
capability-based planning model; 
b. to champion the adoption of safety risk management within the 
individual responder communities; and 
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c. to change organizational cultures and ensure that ORM and CRM 
can be integrated across the HLDS responder community.   
Using the strategic planning model, these recommendations can be expressed in terms of 
a strategic goal and vision: 
Strategic Goal:  Improve safety, enhance mission effectiveness and 
sustainability, and increase the operational readiness of HLDS responders 
• through CRM’s human-factors based integration of ORM tools that 
enables 
• recognition of risks to people, platforms, equipment and mission 
readiness; evaluation of these risks; and control and management of 
the risks  
• in accordance with the following principles: 
o accept no unnecessary risk 
o accept necessary risk when benefits outweigh costs 
o make risk decisions at the appropriate level 
o use ORM continuously in executing as well as in planning  
• by integrating these safety risk management components into the 
national capabilities-based planning process. 
Strategic Vision:  Well prepared, HLDS responders who systematically 
use CRM skills and principles to employ ORM, increasing their 
effectiveness, sustainability and the safety of their teams and the public. 
This goal and vision, in combination with development of comprehensive safety 
metrics, accountability and especially strong leadership, can form the basis for future 
development of a comprehensive approach aimed at building a safety risk management 
capability for HLDS responders.  Such an approach should provide the tools, the training, 
and the capabilities to enable them to meet the strategic objective of safely and 
effectively providing their vital services to the Nation and its citizens 
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